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Abstract. In this paper, the details of critical infrastructure protection program of 
United States of America are shared by taking the cyber resilience into account. 
The academic and institutional studies on the concepts of cyber maturity, critical 
infrastructure protection program and cyber resilience are explained in detail. By 
the help of these studies and national efforts, the relations among these concepts 
are proposed. The key components of a cyber security strategy and action plan for 
a cyber resilient society is proposed by taking these three concepts into account.  
As the final step, the recent cyber security efforts of Turkey is shared with the 
reader and assesses according to the determined key components.  
Keywords. Critical Infrastructures, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Cyber 
Resilience, Cyber Maturity, Cybersecurity Strategy 
1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare and/or 
national security of countries. In recent years, both government officials and academia 
work through the damage potential of cyber war to critical infrastructures. Most of the 
developed countries have governmental/national critical infrastructure protection 
programs. All of the critical infrastructure protection programs take the consequences 
of cyber threats and/or a possible cyber war into consideration. Turkey has such a 
critical infrastructure protection program as well. By looking at the results of the two-
year cyber efforts in Turkey, it can be seen that the success of critical infrastructure 
protection program is directly related to the level of the national cyber maturity. The 
second finding is the relation between critical infrastructure protection program and 
cyber resilience. A successful critical infrastructure protection program will result in a 
resilient society against cyber threats and cyber war. In this regard, critical 
infrastructure protection program stands between national cyber security and cyber 
resilience in the context of cyber war. 
Firstly, national cyber maturity is a must-have baseline for the success of critical cyber 
efforts of Turkey; especially the ones that require the cooperation between different 
types of organizations. The critical infrastructure protection program will be left 
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unfinished and be condemned to fail without sufficient level of the national cyber 
maturity. The most important subjects of national cyber maturity are individuals and 
organizations. There are vital technical and organizational efforts that will create or 
increase the cyber maturity of individuals and organizations within a country and will 
result in cyber maturity of a country. There are good practices in Turkey for this goal. 
These efforts will definitely take some time in order to be internalized by individuals 
and organizations, also these efforts need to be measured and assessed in order to take 
consecutive actions.  
Secondly, cyber resilient society is a result of a successful critical infrastructure 
protection program. Once a countrywide and strategically embraced critical 
infrastructure protection program is succeeded, the effects of this program will 
penetrate into the organizations, individuals and society by taking some technical or 
organizational actions like awareness activities, exercises and new coordinator bodies. 
So that cyber resilient society will emerge. Therefore, national cyber maturity is a 
prerequisite to a successful critical infrastructure protection program. In the same way; 
critical infrastructure protection program is a prerequisite to cyber resilient society. 
Although it seems like the efforts pertaining to these three concepts are sequential, they 
should be iteratively completed. As an example, the output of critical infrastructure 
protection program may provide useful inputs to national cyber security efforts.  
This article will focus on both technical (IT) and organizational/policy (public and 
private sector) aspects of cyber security. In order to build a cyber-resilient society to 
cyber warfare, best practices will be shared with the government officials and 
researchers.  
2. Background 
At this section, firstly, the term critical infrastructure is defined and the brief history of 
the term is shared. Secondly, the use of cyber systems in critical infrastructures and the 
rise of cyber threats are depicted with examples. Thirdly, the terms critical 
infrastructure protection and cyber resilience are explained by giving example from 
United States of America. Fourthly, the studies that explore the cyber maturity and 
cyber readiness are summarized. 
2.1. Cyber Systems and Cyber Threats as Enablers 
Any physical or cyber infrastructure is called critical infrastructure, if damage to that 
infrastructure will have a harmful effect on economy of the country, social order and/or 
national security [1]. The term critical Infrastructure is first used within the Executive 
Order of President of United States in 1996 [2]. The purpose of the order was to 
introduce the term “Critical Infrastructure Protection”, to define the problem and to 
establish interim commissions in order to recommend comprehensive strategies and 
amendments to the existing laws in order to protect critical infrastructures. Executive 
order mentioned two types of threats against critical infrastructures; physical threats 
and cyber threats. Although, critical infrastructures exist long before the widespread 
use of cyber technologies and Internet prevalence; the Critical Infrastructure Protection 
is defined as an important governmental term because of dominant use of cyber 
systems in infrastructures that serve society. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
cyber systems welcomes a novel type of threats; called cyber threats. Cyber threats are 
asymmetric in nature; an attacker can hide himself easily, the cyber weapons are 
extremely cheap and prevalent compared to the conventional weapons. Therefore, 
cyber threats pay the way for harmful attacks against critical infrastructures easily and 
effortlessly. Secondly, cyber systems caused or increased interdependencies among 
critical infrastructures. These interdependencies are considered the main cause of 
cascading failures [3], [4]. Meaning that, a problem in one infrastructure may result in a 
subsequent failure in another. As an example, a problem in telecommunication 
infrastructure may have weakening effect on finance infrastructure, as witnessed in 
Russian hackers’ attacks to Estonian networks in 2007 [5]. Therefore, countries started 
to think about critical infrastructure protection more seriously. 
2.2. Cyber Threat Landscape 
Today, cyber systems are used vastly in monitoring and controlling of critical 
infrastructures. SCADA systems that are used in controlling energy, water management 
systems are example of such cyber systems. Smart grids, smart transportation systems, 
remotely controllable local gas distribution systems have been emerging as vital parts 
of modern society. Apart from SCADA systems, some critical infrastructures are 
completely dependent on conventional cyber systems. For instance, the banking and 
finance infrastructure depends on conventional information technologies to a great 
extent. The daily operations of banking and finance companies are totally depended on 
their huge server parks and network infrastructures. Telecommunication infrastructure 
is completely composed of cyber systems. In other words, cyber systems created a new 
critical infrastructure called telecommunication. Without telecommunication 
infrastructures, modern society cannot be maintained. Because of new service models 
like cloud computing, Internet can be regarded as critical infrastructure. The attacks to 
the Estonia networks in 2007 showed how a well-being of a country is depended on 
Internet infrastructure.  
Although Internet is physically distributed, it is logically single. Therefore, Internet 
connects physically detached things (people, organizations and states) in the same 
medium. This means that, we share the same medium with cyber attackers having 
different motivations; from cyber criminals to state sponsored hackers. Today, some of 
the critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet [6]. The infrastructures that do 
not have direct connection to Internet are usually connected to internal production 
networks of organizations. Hence, critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet 
after passing one hop [7].  
Once a simple search is performed by using popular search engines, one can come 
across with a number of news speaking of cyber attacks against critical infrastructures 
like nuclear plant, electrical grid, sewing infrastructure, flight control systems and 
harbor [8], [9].  
2.3. Critical Infrastructure Protection Program and Cyber Resilience 
The use of cyber systems at critical infrastructures is a necessity without doubt. For 
some infrastructures, Internet connection is a rigid requirement to serve citizens and/or 
customers suitably. The focus for critical infrastructure operators is the contribution of 
cyber systems to efficient and cost effective management of critical infrastructures. 
However for states, cyber systems must be used according to some specific policies 
because of attack potential of cyber threats. At this point, critical infrastructure 
protection program comes to scene. The importance of critical infrastructures 
necessitates the state level coordination of security efforts according to the some rigid 
policies, strategies and procedures. These hierarchical set of rules are called critical 
infrastructure protection program. Critical infrastructure protection program is the 
national and coordinated efforts in order to keep the critical infrastructures protected 
from both cyber and physical threats. A number of countries, including developing 
ones, have critical infrastructure protection programs. Some developed countries, like 
Unites States of America, have been working on this subject for decades. Most of the 
developed countries started to prepare programs within last five to ten years. Today, 
critical infrastructure protection programs of all countries give an important place to 
cyber threats.  
In developed countries, critical infrastructure protection program is an important part of 
the national security efforts. In other words, national security officials take cyber 
security into account because of widespread use of cyber systems and their vulnerable 
nature. This consideration is materialized with the critical infrastructure protection 
programs. Because critical infrastructure protection programs fall under national 
security programs of developed countries, critical infrastructure protection programs 
not only deal with cyber threats but also with physical threats. 
Critical infrastructure protection program is not a single strategy document or it is not 
associated with a single governmental effort. It does not have to be a unified effort or 
document with predefined start and due dates so that after some sufficient time period 
critical infrastructures will be protected. Rather, it is an ongoing and always evolving 
set of activities, which can be revised according to the new type of threats or recently 
added national critical infrastructures. That is, critical infrastructure protection is an 
everlasting process. It is the total effort of a country in order to protect critical 
infrastructures from cyber and physical threats. A critical infrastructure program is 
composed of policies, strategies, standards, legislations. As environment and 
requirements change, new policies and strategies may be released, new responsibilities 
may be emerged. Since an effective critical infrastructure protection program requires 
the participation of a number of public and private entities, the coordinator body should 
be at the highest possible government level. 
2.3.1. Cyber Resilience Efforts of Unites States of America 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan is the central document of the current critical 
infrastructure protection program of United States of America [10]. The subtitle of the 
plan is “Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience”. As this subtitle 
implies, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan emphasizes the partnership of 
public and private entities. The aim of the plan is to establish the collaboration and 
cooperation routines in order to achieve secure and resilient infrastructures. National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan is released pursuant to the Presidential Policy Directive-
21 [11]. The name of Presidential Policy Directive -21 is Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience. This directive can be regarded as the initiator of the critical 
infrastructure protection efforts of United States in recent years. Presidential Policy 
Directive -21 equally emphasize the physical and cyber threats. Directive says that “It 
is the policy of the United States to strengthen the security and resilience of its critical 
infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats.” 
The term “resilience” is used both in National Infrastructure Protection Plan and 
Presidential Policy Directive – 21. It implies that the protection of critical 
infrastructures is an exhaustive process; it should be considered as not a simple result. 
Presidential Policy Directive – 21 defines resilience as “the ability to prepare for and 
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. 
Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, 
accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents”.  
Cyber resilience can be defined as the robustness of a country against cyber attacks. It 
is the preparedness efforts of a country for a cyber war. Therefore, cyber resilience is 
something parallel with defensive actions of a state [12]. The offensive strategies and 
efforts cannot be regarded within the cyber resilience effort of a state. Hence, there is 
strong relationship between critical infrastructure protection programs and cyber 
resilience. Critical infrastructure protection program is the prominent effort in order to 
have a cyber resilient country and society.  
2.3.2. National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
Some introductory information about National Infrastructure Protection Plan is given in 
the previous section. The national plan is a document that sets forth the details of a risk 
management framework and a detailed call to action. Risk management is the core 
process for critical infrastructure security and resilience; and it is fully integrated with 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Because achieving resilience is directly 
related with the successful risk management process [10]. The proposed risk 
management framework has five steps. These steps are: 
1) Set goals and objectives 
2) Identify infrastructures 
3) Assess and analyze risks 
4) Implement risk management activities 
5) Measure effectiveness 
According to the framework, physical, cyber, and human elements of critical 
infrastructures should be considered through all steps of the framework. Entire risk 
management framework is accompanied by information sharing mechanisms. 
Information sharing is used as feedback mechanism to convey the results of 
measurement of effectiveness. All of the steps of risk management framework is set 
forth in this section. The linkage between these steps and call to action items are shown 
with call-out boxes. National Infrastructure Protection Plan does not urge critical 
infrastructure operators to use this framework. Rather, risk management framework is 
an “organizing construct” for different type of infrastructures.  
The call to action section of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan is a detailed 
action plan in order to enhance national critical infrastructure security and resilience. 
This section refer to all of the critical infrastructure partners and stakeholders, whether 
public and private entity. The basic themes of the call to action section are sector or 
cross-sector collaboration, cooperation, partnership and information sharing among 
different types of partners and stakeholders. The details of collaboration, cooperation, 
partnership and information sharing activities and routines are given under this section. 
Call to action has twelve actions to advance national efforts. All of these actions are 
linked to national goals by using call-out boxes which were given in second section of 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  
National Infrastructure Protection Plan contain the list of the partners and stakeholders 
of the critical infrastructure protection community, form federal government agencies 
to private sector entities. The document also list the roles, responsibilities and 
capabilities of these stakeholder. These appendices are extremely useful for the experts 
who try to understand the organizational structure of United States.  
2.3.3. Presidential Policy Directive – 21 
Presidential Policy Directive -21 is the stimulus of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan. It determined the organizational structure, roles and responsibilities for 
critical infrastructure protection. Presidential Policy Directive -21 organized critical 
infrastructure into 16 sectors and identified Sector-Specific Agencies for these sectors. 
It is important to share some remarkable points of the Presidential Policy Directive - 21. 
The “interconnectedness and interdependency” of critical infrastructures are 
emphasized in the directive. Directive draws attention to interconnectedness and 
interdependency in order to emphasize the importance of coordination, collaboration 
and partnership. Directive mentions the “effective partnerships with critical 
infrastructure owners and operators”. It is said that “this partnership is imperative to 
strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure”. Three 
strategic imperatives for critical infrastructure security and resilience are:  
1) “Refining and clarifying functional relationships across the Federal 
Government” 
2) “Enable effective information exchange” 
3) “Implement an integration and analysis function” [11].  
From these excerpts, it can be easily seen that, isolated, infrastructure-specific efforts 
do not performed. Because of connected nature of cyber space, the national efforts have 
to be unified, collaborative. These efforts have to take interdependencies, relationships 
and partnership into account. These are prerequisites of a successful Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Plan. These prerequisites are not technical countermeasures. 
These can be thought as soft skills of a state. Soft skills means they are related with 
security culture and years and even decades can be required in order to be internalized. 
Once internalized, cyber maturity is succeeded.  
Finally, Presidential Policy Directive – 21 emphasize the importance of international 
cooperation and promoting research and development activities.  
2.3.4. Executive Order - 13636 
Executive Order – 13636 is released at the same time with Presidential Policy Directive 
– 21 [13]. The title of the Executive Order 13636 is Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity. As the name implies, it is dedicated to cyber security Executive Order – 
13636 is released after the delay of US Cybersecurity Act in Senate in summer of 2012. 
Executive Order – 13636 assigns duty to Federal Government to coordinate with 
critical infrastructure owners and operators to improve information sharing and 
collaboratively develop and implement risk-based approaches to cybersecurity [10].  
Some of tasks that are assigned by Executive Order to Federal Agencies are as follows:  
1) Increasing the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information 
shared with U.S. private sector entities (Responsible bodies: Attorney General, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence) 
2) Expanding the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program (voluntary 
information sharing program) to all critical infrastructure sectors in order to 
assist the owners and operators of critical infrastructure in protecting their 
systems (Responsible bodies: the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of Defense)  
3) Developing a Cybersecurity Framework (Responsible body: National Institute 
of Standards and Technology Director) This framework is prepared by the 
participation of representative of public and private organizations and released 
[14]. 
4) Reviewing the preliminary release of Cybersecurity Framework (Responsible 
bodies: Sector-Specific Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Office 
of Management and Budget) 
5) Preparing a report for the President, on the feasibility, security benefits, and 
relative merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning 
and contract administration. (Responsible body: Secretary of Defense)  
6) Using a risk-based approach to identify critical infrastructure, reviewing and 
updating the list of identified critical infrastructure on an annual basis 
(Responsible bodies: the Secretary of Homeland Security) 
2.4. Cyber Maturity and Cyber Readiness: The Definitions 
There is limited number of academic studies that try to define the term cyber maturity 
on its own. However they express slight difference between these terms. Most of the 
studies use cyber maturity instead of cyber readiness. The term cyber maturity and 
readiness is used in order to represent the preparedness level of the states against cyber 
threats.  
Cyber maturity is a set of underlying soft skills of a country in order to increase its 
cyber resilience persistently and continuously. These skills help a country in 
succeeding its cyber security efforts like critical infrastructure protection program. The 
critical infrastructure protection programs of cyber mature countries always evolves 
and improves. Cyber maturity is not a technical notion. It is the set of capabilities that 
are created and internalized in a long time. It is closely related with the security culture 
and awareness level of society.  The countries that are mature in terms of cyber security, 
will probably have long lasting and ever evolving critical infrastructure protection 
programs. This kind of countries increase their cyber resilience constantly over years.  
These good practices are underlying success factors for countries dealing with cyber 
threats and will definitely affect the quality of critical infrastructure protection 
programs. If a country implements these good practices, critical infrastructure 
protection program will be successful. If a country is not mature, its cyber security 
efforts will not be vigorous. Although the country may take successful steps for the 
cyber security of critical infrastructures occasionally, the efforts will not be long lasting, 
they will probably depend on some enthusiastic people or organizations. In other words, 
the efforts will not be the result of the real state policy.  
In this section of paper, the parameters and metrics that constitutes the cyber maturity 
are extracted from the efforts of United States, OECD (Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development), ITU (International Telecommunication Union) and 
related academic studies. While examining these studies, the technical countermeasures 
and policy items are not on focus, but the underlying long-term countermeasure, which 
are mostly related with the security culture.  
2.4.1. The Paper of Hurley, Kern, & Everetts 
This academic work draws a difference between cyber maturity and cyber readiness. 
Cyber readiness implies completeness; however this is not possible [15]. Because 
100% security is impossible. Therefore, authors propose the term cyber maturity 
instead of cyber readiness in order to have more practical outcomes. According to the 
paper, the concept of cyber readiness is usually used with the terms situational 
awareness and resilience. Some crucial components that imply a cyber-mature state are 
extracted from the paper. These components are: 
1) Information sharing 
2) Education and awareness activities 
3) Support for cyber research and development 
4) Risk assessment and management 
5) Performance measurement 
6) Executive support 
7) Addressing international challenges 
8) Determining detailed roles and responsibilities 
9) Overarching cybersecurity strategy 
10) Justification the need for investments by measuring costs.  
2.4.2. The Paper of White  
According to the White, a certain level cyber security maturity has to be accomplished 
in order to prevent and detect cyber events [16]. At this paper, cyber security maturity 
is stated along with the current cyber security posture. The paper devises the model 
called Community Cyber Security Maturity Model, having five levels form initial to 
vanguard level. According to the White, there are four key areas for cyber security 
maturity. These are awareness, information sharing, processes and procedures to handle 
cyber events and test and evaluation of the cyber security countermeasures. The author 
emphasis the importance of training in order to transition from one level to upper level.  
2.4.3. Development of Policies for Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures 
The OECD publication named Development of Policies for Protection of Critical 
Information Infrastructures compares the development of policies for the protection of 
critical infrastructures in seven developed countries [17].  
The comparative study of OECD shares some of the good practices of cyber security. It 
is said that these good practices are critical for successful implementation of 
information security in public and private organizations. Some of these good practices 
are listed as follows: 
1) Clear policy and objectives for cyber security have to be set at state level.  
2) The adopted approach for cyber security have to be consistent with the culture 
of all the participants, whether public or private.  
3) The state administration have to support and commit to the cyber security 
studies. 
4) Risk assessment and management processes have to be internalized in order to 
identify the requirements of cyber security. 
5) Information sharing has to be substantiated effectively among all of the 
participants.  
6) All relevant policy and standards have to be distributed to all of the 
participants.  
7) Required training and education facilities have to be performed.  
8) In order to improve persistently and continually, measurements have to be 
conducted in order to review the studies and countermeasures and give 
necessary feedbacks.  
Based on the good practices, some components are examined by OECD in order to 
compare the critical infrastructure protection studies of seven developed countries. It is 
claimed that these components are taken by governments into account when 
implementing critical infrastructure programs. These components are: 
1) A national strategy  
2) Legal foundations  
3) Incident response capability  
4) Industry-government partnerships  
5) A culture of security  
6) Information sharing mechanisms  
7) Risk management approach  
Some of the good practices and components that are listed in OECD report can be 
regarded as the parameters of cyber maturity.  
2.4.4. Global Cybersecurity Index 
Another comparative study is performed by ITU, which is called Global Cybersecurity 
Index [18]. It is an ITU and ABI Research joint project in order to rank the 
cybersecurity capabilities of countries. Four goals of this study are listed in the 
webpage. These goals are as follows:  
1) Promote government strategies at a national level 
2) Drive implementation efforts across industries and sectors 
3) Integrate security into the core of technological progress  
4) Foster a global culture of cybersecurity 
In order to reach these goals, ITU and ABI Research intent to identify the metrics of 
cyber security performances of the nation states. A global ranking mechanism is aimed 
based on these metrics. One of the important part of the project is its mechanism to 
collect data. There are primary and secondary data sources. Primary data source is the 
relevant national stakeholders. The secondary data source is publicly available sources. 
There is an online questionnaire in project webpage as well. Anybody can participate in 
this questionnaire. Another important part of the project is contact with relevant 
organizations of nations’ in order to acquire data from primary sources. The final goal 
of the project is to publish a global cybersecurity index of nation states.  
The study of Global Cybersecurity Index evaluates the cyber security developments of 
the states according to the five different areas. These areas are:  
1) Legal Measures  
2) Technical Measures  
3) Organizational Measures  
4) Capacity Building  
5) Cooperation 
Under legal measures area, both criminal legislation and general cyber security 
regulation / compliance are assessed. Technical measures look at the existence of 
national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), the government-
approved standardization and personal certification studies. In organizational measures 
area, the existence of a policy, which is expected to cover the following areas, are 
examined:  
1) Clear responsibility of cyber security at all levels of the government 
2) Clearly defined, public and transparent roles and responsibilities;  
3) Promotion of private sector involvement and public-private partnership 
In this section, the existence of cyber security governance, responsible agency for 
implementation of cyber security policies and the national benchmarking in the light of 
nationally adopted standards are examined as well. Under the capacity building section, 
the studies of the standardization development, the professional manpower 
development, individual certification and agency certification are examined. Under the 
cooperation section, intra-state, intra-agency and international cooperation activities are 
examined. Apart from these activities, public-private partnership practices are 
examined as well. 
ITU published the parameters of ranking at project’s webpage in Global Cybersecurity 
Index Conceptual Framework document which can be downloaded from project’s 
website.  
2.4.5. Cyber Readiness Index 
A similar study was performed by cyber security expert Melissa Hathaway in 2013 [19]. 
The name of this study was Cyber Readiness Index. Hathaway published five 
evaluation criteria in order to determine whether a country is cyber ready or not. These 
criteria are as follows:  
1) The existence of national cyber security strategy 
2) The existence of operational Computer Security Incident Response Team 
3) The commitment (by country) to protect against cyber crime  
4) The existence of information sharing mechanisms 
5) The existence of investments and funding (by country) of research activities 
Under the first criterion, not only the existence of national cyber security strategy is 
examined; but also the existence of budged that is assigned to strategy is examined. 
This criterion also considers the participation and engagement of private sector to 
national cyber security strategy.  
Under the second criterion, the existence of tested emergency and recovery plans that 
taking the infrastructure dependencies into account is examined. The existence of 
different networks that are composed of governmental / regulatory bodies and critical 
infrastructure operators with national contact details are exchanged are examined. 
The existence of information sharing and alert system based on this network is also 
examined under this criterion.  
Under the third criterion, some concrete steps are defined in order to struggle with 
cyber crime. First of all, it is asked whether monetary loss because of crimes is 
determined. The other precautions that are questions are threat assessment, 
establishment of criminal offenses, reviewing existing laws, capacity building 
mechanisms.  
Fourth criterion questions some crucial activities that render the information sharing. 
These activities are cross sector incident-information sharing during and after incidents, 
the existence of rapid reaction mechanism, the usage of unclassified intelligence data, 
the existence of situational awareness mechanism, cross sector incident management 
and coordination mechanism that take the interdependencies into account. 
Fifth criterion questions the budget assigned for cyber security research, national 
funding for universities, the ratio of operational products that emanates from research 
activities, the universities that offer degree in cyber security or information security, the 
government incentive for innovation, the commitment to the internationally accepted 
interoperability and security standards and the commitment to protect intellectual 
property.  
By using the results of these projects and documents, it is possible to say that if a 
country lacks the following parameters or it has some deficiencies at these parameters, 
it is not a mature country in terms of cyber security:  
1) Overarching cyber security regulation that covers critical infrastructures  
2) Public-private partnership for cyber security  
3) Existence of information sharing and exchange mechanisms, existence of 
collaboration and cooperation mechanism based on the relationships at state 
level 
4) Existence of cyber security budgeting at state level and the funding of cyber 
security research 
5) Existence of cyber security awareness and culture at state level, which also 
flourishes the information security governance 
3. Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts of Turkey 
Since 2013, Turkey implemented some important steps at policy and strategy level in 
order to become more resilient against cyber threats. These steps are: 
1) The establishment of Cyber Security Council  
2) The development and enactment of national cyber security strategy and 2013-
2014 action plan  
3) The cyber security amendments to the Telecommunications law 
The cyber security council was established in October of 2012 with eleven permanent 
members under the chairmanship of Minister of Telecommunication. All of the 
members are representatives of public organizations. Any organization whether public 
or private can be invited to the meeting of council according to the agenda. According 
to the rules of action of council, it meets every six months regularly. The principal 
duties of the council are  
1) to determine the countermeasures 
2) to approve policies, strategies and plans regarding cyber security; and  
3) to ensure the application and coordination of policies, strategies, plans.  
National cyber security strategy and 2013-2014 action plan was enacted in June of 
2013. There are twenty-nine action items in cyber security action plan. These items are 
distributed under six different themes. These themes are: 
1) Regulatory measures (2)  
2) Activities to help with judicial processes (1) 
3) Establishing the National Cyber Incidents Response Organization (1) 
4) Strengthening the National Cyber Security Infrastructure (14) 
5) Human Resources Education and Awareness Raising Activities in the Field of 
Cyber Security (6) 
6) Developing National Technologies in the field of Cyber Security (4) 
7) Extending the Scope of National Cyber Security Mechanisms (1) 
The numbers in parentheses are the number of action item in the theme.  
Every action item is assigned to one responsible organization and at least one relevant 
organization. All of the organizations, responsible or relevant, in action plan are public 
organizations. There are thirty-one organizations in action plan. Fifteen of them have 
responsibilities for at least one action item.  
The scope of the national cyber security strategy and 2013-2014 action plan is the 
public organizations and critical infrastructures whether public or private organizations. 
Therefore, the private organizations that have operations in a noncritical sectors are not 
covered by national cyber security strategy and action plan.  
A quick analysis of the action items yields the following results:  
1) Six of the actions items are related with only public organizations. 
2) One of the action item is related with only critical infrastructures. 
3) Eight of the actions items are related with both public organizations and 
critical infrastructures. 
4) Four of the action items are related with the universities, national education of 
different levels.  
5) Ten of the action items are related with the whole country; although the scope 
of the strategy is public organizations and critical infrastructures.  
The English version of National cyber security strategy and 2013-2014 action plan of 
Turkey can be downloaded from Internet page of ENISA or CCD-COEi. 
The cyber security amendments to the Telecommunications law are performed in 
February of 2014. These amendments can be summarized as follows:  
1) Insertion of Cyber Security Council with its roles and responsibilities 
2) Insertion of new roles and responsibilities of Ministry of Telecommunication 
regarding cyber security  
3) Insertion of new roles and responsibilities of Information and 
Telecommunications Technologies Authority regarding cyber security 
The following roles and responsibilities of Ministry of Telecommunications are stated 
in the amendments:  
1) Determining the policies, strategies and goals in order to ensure the national 
cyber security , 
2) Determining the methods and standards in order to ensure the cyber security 
for public organizations, individuals, and organizations, 
3) Preparing action plans, 
4) Fulfilling the responsibilities regarding secretariat of cyber security council, 
5) Coordination of cyber security tasks, 
6) Determining critical infrastructures and related organizations, 
7) Establishing and auditing the required response centers, 
8) Supporting the studies on producing national software and hardware 
9) Executing the cyber security awareness and training activities  
3.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Program of Turkey 
According to the National Cyber Security Framework Manual, a reference book 
prepared by NATO Collaborative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, cyber security 
function in national strategies can grouped in five different mandates [20]. These are: 
1) Military Cyber Operations 
2) Counter Cyber Crime 
3) Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence 
4) Cyber Security Crisis Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection 
5) Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy 
When one examine the action items of Turkey’s cyber security strategy, the major and 
dominant mandate of Turkey’s cyber security strategy is “Cyber Security Crisis 
Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection”. There are some sections and a few 
action items about the “Counter Cyber Crime”. However these items do not enough to 
change the emphasis to another mandate. There are no items about military operations, 
cyber intelligence and internet governance and cyber diplomacy mandates in Turkey’s 
cyber security strategy.  
When we look at Turkish national cyber security strategy and action items as a whole, 
it can be easily seen that Turkey tries to establish basic but essential countermeasures 
in order to increase cyber resilience. The action items under first and second themes 
aim to create necessary legal infrastructures on which other countermeasure will be 
built. The only action item under third theme is action-item 4, which proposes the 
establishment National Cyber Incidents Response Team (TR-CSIRT). The same action 
item also proposes the establishment of Sectorial CSIRT for critical sectors and CSIRT 
for public organizations. This action item is extremely important for state, sector and 
organizational level cyber resilience. The establishment of sectorial CSIRTS is one the 
most crucial study of Critical Infrastructure Protection agenda of Turkey. There are 
fourteen action items under fourth theme. For context of this article, the most important 
action items of this theme is action-item 5, which is called “Information security 
management program in critical infrastructures”. This action item proposes the 
following sub-actions:  
1) Determination of critical infrastructures  
2) Sectorial risk analysis of one of the critical infrastructures (pilot risk analysis) 
3) Determination and publication of the method of sectorial risk analysis 
4) Conducting risk analysis (yearly) 
5) Determination of the requirements of sectorial emergency action plan and 
business continuity plan 
6) Determining and implementing the sectorial security precautions according to 
the risk analysis, emergency plan and business continuity plan 
The responsible organization for the first two sub-actions is The Scientific and 
Technological Research Council of Turkey. The responsible organizations for the other 
sub-actions are the public organizations responsible for regulating and auditing the 
critical sectors. 
The last action item that is directly related with the security of critical infrastructures is 
action-item 10, which is under fourth team as well. Action-item 10 proposes publishing 
the document of fundamental rules of secure software development for the software to 
be used in critical infrastructures, preparing a feasibility report and submission of this 
report to cyber security council.  
The major mandate of Turkey’s cyber security strategy is “Cyber Security Crisis 
Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection” as stated earlier. In this regard, the 
whole cyber security strategy can be seen as a holistic critical infrastructure protection 
program. On the other hand, there are three action items that are explicitly relates 
security study to critical infrastructures. The directly related action items and their 
effects on critical infrastructures are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. The action items that are directly related with the security of critical infrastructures 
The number of action item Action item Action sub-item(s) 
4 Establishing the National 
Cyber Incidents Response 
team and establishing the 
Teams for Responding to 
Cyber Incidents for Critical 
Sectors and Public Entities  
• Establishing the sectorial 
CSIRTs which are specific to 
critical infrastructure sectors, 
and creating their teams as well 
as providing trainings for them. 
5 Information security 
management program in 
critical infrastructures 
• Determination of critical 
infrastructures  
• Sectorial risk analysis of one of 
the critical infrastructures (pilot 
risk analysis) 
• Determination and publication of 
the method of sectorial risk 
analysis 
• Conducting risk analysis (yearly) 
• Determination of the 
requirements of sectorial 
emergency action plan and 
business continuity plan 
• Determining and implementing 
the sectorial security precautions 
according to the risk analysis, 
emergency plan and business 
continuity plan 
10 Implementation of the 
software security program 
• Publishing the document on 
fundamental rules on secure 
software development 
independent from programming 
languages for the software to be 
used in critical infrastructures. 
• The preparation of feasibility 
report and submission of the 
report to the cyber security 
council. 
 
There are some other action items within the action plan that may be considered as 
contributing to the critical infrastructure protection program. However these 
contributions can be regarded as indirect contributions. This action items are listed at 
Table 2. The first action item at 
Table 2 propose to establish a distributed honeypot system to the national public 
network in order to detect and response to cyber incident in a timely manner. The 
second action item at 
Table 2 propose the establishment of a crisis management structure. Once this crisis 
management structure established, it will definitely improve the security of 
infrastructure especially during a cyber attack.  
Table 2. The other action items that contributes to the Critical Infrastructure Protection 
The number of action item Action item Action sub-item(s) 
11 Implementation of cyber 
threats prevention project 
• Establishing a Honeypot 
system to detect cyber 
threats. 
29 Integrating national cyber 
security concepts into the 
national security context 
• Determining the 
responsibilities of public 
organizations in case of 
cyber security incidents in 
the cyber space and how to 
ensure coordination at 
national level 
• Determining high priority 
potential attack scenarios 
targeting the country, 
including the effects of these 
attacks. 
• Determining priority actions 
required to be carried out to 
analyze and improve the 
status of the mechanisms that 
would be used in case of 
potential cyber security 
incidents. 
3.2. Assessment of Cyber Security Maturity Efforts of Turkey 
When we look at the efforts of Turkey between 2013 and 2014, the following results 
can be obtained: 
• The correct steps are taken at the beginning.  
o Cyber Security Council is established in order to take decision 
effectively.  
o Cyber security strategy and action plan is prepared in a short time. 
o The council and the ministry that is responsible for coordination 
gained jurisdiction by law 
• Some progress is observed in last two years. These are:  
o Turkey determined its critical infrastructures. Because it is not 
published by government, the authors cannot share the list of them.  
o National CSIRT is established. 
o A number of technical trainings on cyber security are completed. 
o Cyber security master programs are opened within at least five 
universities. 
Despite the existence of some improvements in last two years, a number of tasks have 
not been finished or even started. The most important indication for this situation is the 
action items in national cyber security strategy and action plan. The action plan will 
expire by end of 2014. The number of completed action items are quite low compared 
to the uncompleted action items.  
When the authors analyzed the core reasons for this situation, it has been seen that the 
imperfections in cyber maturity resulted in this situation. 
First of all, there is no overarching regulation that cover all critical infrastructures by 
assigning duties to critical infrastructure operators and regulatory bodies of critical 
sectors. The only effective regulation is the one that assigns duties to Ministry of 
Communication. However assigning duties to coordinator body but not assigning any 
responsibility to others will be not be effective.  
Cyber security is a horizontal area because of ubiquitous use of cyber systems. 
Therefore cyber security is the common problem of all organizations in all sectors such 
that health, energy, transportation, public services. This situation requires collaboration 
and cooperation in order to cope with cyber threats [21]. Because, a threat to a sector 
will probably be threat to another. Threat information exchange is crucial in order to 
deal with cyber threat. In Turkey, because of the privacy and confidentiality constraints, 
organizations usually keep away from information sharing. The culture of cooperation, 
collaboration and information exchange is quite tenuous because of lack of mechanism 
to flourish these opportunities.  
Public-private partnership is an accelerative force in order to cyber resilient societies. It 
is important to combat cyber threats [22]. It is an important instrument at the efforts 
securing critical infrastructures [23]. Turkey has not discovered the potential power of 
the private sector in cyber security. First example is that, private organizations did not 
participated in the preparation process of national cyber security strategy and action 
plan. The second example is that, there is no private sector representative in cyber 
security council. There are some critical sectors in which both public and private 
operators have operations. However there is not or limited information and experience 
sharing practices. There are no incentives by regulatory agencies in order to encourage 
the information sharing between public and private infrastructure operators.  
Although some concrete improvements has been done during last two years, Turkey do 
not assigned budget to cyber security studies. The president of cyber security council 
stated that, there will be no specific budget, organizations shall use the budget 
dedicated to information processing facilities. The existence of dedicated budget will 
definitely be one of the driving factors for continual cyber security.  
The final constituent of cyber maturity is security awareness. Unfortunately, the low 
level security awareness is a problem for Turkey. Despite the developments in recent 
years, cyber security awareness is not prevalent at state level, only a few organizations 
are aware of the criticality of cyber threats. This problem diffuse to the organizations. 
The most notable reflection of this problem to organizations is the lack of information 
security governance. The managers of organizations do not value the problem of cyber 
threat correctly.  
4. Conclusion 
The success of critical infrastructure protection program is directly related to the level 
of the national cyber maturity. A successful critical infrastructure protection program 
will result in a resilient society against cyber threats and cyber war. In this regard, 
critical infrastructure protection program stands between national cyber security and 
cyber resilience in the context of cyber war. 
Once a countrywide and strategically embraced critical infrastructure protection 
program is succeeded, the effects of this program will penetrate into the organizations, 
individuals and society by taking some technical or organizational actions like 
awareness activities, exercises and new coordinator bodies. So that cyber resilient 
society will emerge. Therefore, national cyber maturity is a prerequisite to a successful 
critical infrastructure protection program. In the same way; critical infrastructure 
protection program is a prerequisite to cyber resilient society. Although it seems like 
the efforts pertaining to these three concepts are sequential, they should be iteratively 
completed. As an example, the output of critical infrastructure protection program may 
provide useful inputs to national cyber security efforts.  
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